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The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle
Richard A. Epstein1
The Missing Piece of the Puzzle
The standard first year curriculum in an American Law School divides the
private law materials into three main courses: property, torts, and contracts. This
organization is not simply an arbitrary assemblage of categories, but reflects a
powerful, if unarticulated view of the world. Property comes first, and in its initial
and most distinctive portion involves the rules that assign the initial ownership, be
it individual or collective, to persons, either singly or in common. The law of tort
in all of its ramifications is concerned with the protection of ownership of person
(which need not be acquired) and things from various forms of interference, most
typically by force and fraud. Finally, the law of contract addresses the way in
which these entitlements to labor and property may be voluntarily exchanged.
Taken together, these rules allow one to start with the basic building blocks of
nature and to develop the complex financial and legal arrangements on which all
forms of business relationships depend.2
The scheme is not merely one of interest to common lawyers, but also to
philosophers as well. David Hume’s, A Treatise of Human Nature3 specifies “three
fundamental rules of nature, that of the stability of possession, of its transference by
consent, and of the performance of promises.” His list does not show a perfect
correspondence to the traditional categories of property, tort and contract, but
with only a little tugging and hauling the basic parallels come through. The
stability of possession involves both rules of acquisition and protection; while the
rules of transfer of property and the keeping of promises appear to cover the basic
law of contracts, the former with respect to the transfer of property and the latter
with both that and the rendition of personal services.4 The same tripartite division
echoes more closely to the common law divisions in more modern work. Thus
Robert Nozick’s justly celebrated book Anarchy, State and Utopia5 argues that three
distinct types of rules are necessary to offer a complete account of justice in
individual holdings and entitlements. His rules of acquisition correspond to the
1 James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago. I
should like to thank Jay Wright for his usual able research assistance.
2 For a summary of how the parts fit together, see Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex
World (forthcoming 1995).
3 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, Section VI (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888).
4 Hume’s scheme would have been clearer if he had noted that the transference of property is a
subset of keeping promises, just as the law for conveyancing in the standard property courses is a
subspecies of contract. But while his classification is not perfect, his instincts are, as ever, sound.
5 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
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rules of first possession as they exist at common law; his rules of rectification
correspond to the tort law; and his rules of exchange correspond to the law of
contract.
However attractive this basic scheme from a legal and philosophical
perspective, it is sadly incomplete because it does not give any explicit place to the
law of restitution, or quasi-contract. This body of law is very old, and indeed has
its first explicit development in the Roman texts,6 and was introduced in an
explicit way into the common law by Lord Mansfield in Moses v. MacFerlan, under
the familiar rubric of natural law, with an explicit nod to its Roman sources.7 The
subject continues to be of vast importance in the day-to-day operation of modern
legal systems. During the last part of the nineteenth century, with the treatises of
first Keener and then Woodward,8 it assumed a fairly comprehensive form that
has survived, relatively unscathed, to the present day.9 At one point restitution
was a standard course in the upper year curriculum, but over time and with the
ever greater expansion of public law subjects, it has slowly disappeared from
view, being subsumed in a more general course on remedies, or taught in the
interstices of the basic law of property, tort, and contract. But its ubiquity is a sign
of its theoretical importance, so in this paper, I shall place the question, What is
the role of the restitution principle? Front and center, and hope to show how the
common law coach runs not on three substantive wheels, but on four.
6 See the explicit acknowledgment of the category in Justinian’s Institutes, Book III, Title 13. The
category of quasi-tort was also included but had no survival value. For discussion, see Max Radin,
The Roman Law of Quasi-Contract, 23 Va. L. Rev. 241 (1937).
7 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (1760). He describes the heads of liability as follows:
[I]t lies for money paid by mistake; or upon a consideration which happens to fail; or for
money got through imposition, (express or implied); or extortion; or oppression; or an
undue advantage taken of the plaintiff's situation, contrary to the laws made for the
protection of persons under those circumstances. In one word, the gist of this kind of
action is, that the defendant, upon the circumstances of the case, is obligated by the ties
of natural justice and equity to refund the money.
Note that this definition is in some sense too narrow because it only deals with cases of restitution
which asks for the restoration of money paid over. It could well be that the money is sought for
some other reason (goods consumed by mistake) or that specific relief (the recovery of a thing) is
demand as well, but under the same principles set out by Lord Mansfield. Note too that the
monetary relief was as reflection of the common law limitations on the forms of damages, which
are far less important in modern systems that unify common law and equitable actions. For an
early categorization of the law of quasi-contract, see Arthur L. Corbin, Quasi-Contractual
Obligations, 21 Yale L.J. 533 (1912).
8 William A. Keener, A Treatise on the Law of Quasi-Contracts (1893); Frederic Campbell
Woodward, The Law of Quasi-Contracts (1913). The term restitution seems to have gained
popularity after the initial efforts, doubtless to disentangle the connection between contracts (of
consensual origin) and quasi-contracts which were (well understood) to be quasi contractual.
9 See, e.g., George E. Palmer, Restitution (1978). The leading English treatise is Lord Goff of
Chieveley & Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution (3d ed. 1986).
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The exercise is carried out in several stages. The first section of this paper
investigates the elusive distinction between harms inflicted and benefits conferred,
so critical to the basic divisions of the substantive law. The second section
examines the linkage between the law of restitution and the creation of positive
spillover effects. The third section then analyzes and compares the response to
problems of necessity and mistake in both as it applies in both restitution and
torts. The fourth section shows the hidden role that the restitution principle—how
it accounts for benefits conferred by the defendant—has on the articulation of
general tort principles. The fifth section then indicates the critical role that the
restitution principle has in the public law. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Harms and Benefits: The Initial Baseline
It is commonplace in modern discussions to dispute the usefulness of the line
between harm inflicted and benefit conferred, and by implication the distinction
between restitution and tort, between as it were the harm principle and the benefit
principle.10 So much is said to turn on the choice of the appropriate baseline by
which these calculations are made. If X has a right to a full tuition scholarship to
law school, then an award of half that amount inflicts harm to the extent that the
support is not provided: the absence of a greater benefit is a harm inflicted. But if
X has no right to any scholarship aid at all, then the half tuition scholarship is just
what it sounds likes: a benefit conferred, albeit a benefit smaller than one that
could have been conferred. If Y leaves her land in tact so that a neighbor’s land
retains its support, there is a benefit conferred if the neighbor is not entitled to a
lateral support easement. But if the easement is required by operation of law, then
the baseline shifts; now not digging out the earth no longer confers as benefit on a
neighbor who can count on such support as matter of right. The removal of earth
now counts as an infliction of harm, even without any physical invasion.
The question of benefits and harms therefore is parasitic on the choice of
baselines. And, to complete the argument, the choice of baselines is often said to
be largely arbitrary. This philosophical line of argument is at odds with the
unproblematic way in which most people make judgments about whether benefits
have been conferred or harms inflicted. No one seriously argues (at least when tax
dollars are at stake) that restitution is owed to persons who confer benefits on
others by not subjecting them to criminal assaults even if they are able to do so.
There are no good citizen awards (one hopes) for not murdering during the past
calendar year. Indeed the weakness of the fashionable arguments about the
inevitable crossover from harm to benefit lies not in the first step of the argument,
that is, the proposition that some baseline must be established before judgments of
this sort are allowed. Rather it comes in the second stage of the argument, in the

10 For my crack at the other side of the line, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle—And
How it Grew, in Philosophical Essays on the Law of Torts (David Owen ed. forthcoming 1995).
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insistence that the choice of baselines is largely arbitrary, or at least a function of
some political theory which is heavily freighted in favor of the status quo.11
To see why this last philosophical move is too pessimistic for its own good,
recall for the moment the heavy dependence of the private law on its initial
demarcation of property rights. Here the first order rule, while subject to
refinement as in the lateral support case, is a rule of no physical invasion of the
person, land or things of another. Boundaries may normally not be crossed, and
those who cross them normally do so at some risk unless they can show some
clear justification for their action.12 The condition is in some sense so
unremarkable that it is taken for granted unless and until one starts to think about
the subject from a more systematic point of view. One notable effort in this regard
is Donald Wittman’s important 1984 paper which examined the question of
whether the basic institutions of property and tort (or regulation and taxation)
should be organized around the principle of Liability for Harm or that of
Restitution for Benefit.13
One of Wittman’s important observations was that the single constraint—
create a set of optimal incentives for trade—yield insufficient information for
selecting the optimal set of legal rules. To use his most instructive (and ludicrous)
example, suppose that we think that the opportunity cost price for an apple is $1.
There are two ways that this price can be charged to A who wishes to buy an
apple “owned” (the quotation marks should be because the conception of
ownership quickly becomes Pickwickian) by farmer B, such that A will be worse
off by $1 for each apple so purchased. The first way is too obvious to comment on:
A can buy the apples and pay B the cash. That solution presupposes that B has
property rights and can exclude A at will. But the second is to have B pay A some
sum for the apples not purchased. That sum owed is then reduced by $1 for each
apple that A decides to purchase. Thus if the initial sum owing from B to A is $100,
then when A decides to purchase one apple he gets only $99 from B.
In a topsy-turvey world, however, the incentive effects of A’s decision to
purchase are, when viewed in isolation, the same as they are in a world in which A
must pay for each apple he buys. To the extent that A is made worse off by $1 per
11 See Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 873 (1987).
12 “It is an elementary principle, that every unauthorized, and thereby unlawful entry, into the
close of another, is a trespass. From every such entry against the will of the possessor, the law
infers some damage; if nothing more, the treading down the grass or the herbage, or as here, the
shrubbery.” Doughtery v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 (1835). Note that the statement of law, while powerful
is incorrect insofar as it ignores the body of privileges, not based on consent for entering property,
and thus understates the importance of the restitution principle. See the discussion infra at page 14
25. The theme of boundary crossing, not coincidentally, plays a prominent role in Nozick’s
thought. See his Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974).
13 In a paper of that name: Donald Wittman, Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?, 13 J.
Legal Stud. 57 (1984). For further elaboration on the baseline question, see Gordon, Of harms and
Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. Legal Stud. 449, 452-462 (1992).
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apple purchased in each regime, his incentive to consume at the margin is the
same in both systems. So in a zero transaction cost world, where administrative
costs just don’t matter, the two legal rules appear to have the same effect on the
level of consumption, except perhaps if there is some wealth effect, which from a
distance looks quite small.14
Wittman then goes on to explain that administrative costs do make a
difference, and the decisive difference at that. Part of these costs are incurred to
determine that the sum B must pay A equals $100 for apples not purchased. But
how is that baseline number determined? Perhaps we should increase, or
decrease, it: after all B may have 101 apples. Unfortunately, we have no set of
institutions that can ever settle on this (or any other) number, just as we need no
special reflection to accept the zero baseline of the conventional system. Matters
get still more confused if additional persons are added to the system. In the
conventional world, no one confers a benefit on B from not taking his apples. But
in the topsy-turvey world, if A confers this benefit on B by refusing to take the
apples, then C and D must do the same thing: so that the more productive B is
with his labor, the more he owes to the entire world. The implicit assumption that
only two persons are possible trading partners makes Wittman’s second (“benefit
conferred”) scenario far more plausible than it is. But as B shells out cash to C
through Z, he can take some comfort that he will never be insolvent: presumably
when it comes to shampoo or roof tiles he could be paid in return by the
producers of those goods who likewise have similar obligations to multiple
persons. In fact in a society in which m individuals each produce one distinct good
(i.e., a society without firms or a division of labor), all of us could collect in m - 1
cases, only to lose it all in the one case where we produce. The ideal strategy
would be to get out of production altogether so as to keep the baseline payments
from others, without having to incur the enormous losses of production. Wittman
is surely right when he says that the administrative costs of this rival system
dwarf those conceivable under the current regime, but he seems to be wrong when
he says that the incentive effects are quite the same: with multiple parties the
system is sufficiently zany that it could not survive; and if it did, one pessimistic
equilibrium is that no one would produce anything—perfect equality and total
starvation.
The improbable outcomes of Wittman’s odd property systems have an
important philosophical message to which baseline skeptics should pay heed. One
of the most common arguments against any consequentialist or broadly utilitarian
system is that it is indeterminate in its recommendation for legal rules. The effort
to argue that in the usual case a nontaking is conferring a benefit on those left
14 A wealth effect here refers to the differences in patterns of consumption that depend on the
wealth of the party faced with marginal choices. See Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and
the Law 170-174 (1988). For the position that these are somewhat more important in understanding
the choice of legal rules, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J.
Legal Stud. 225 (1991).
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alone shows that this conclusion is manifestly false on the issues that concern us
most—the delineation of property rights in transactions for ordinary goods and
services. As ever, there is a political moral here as well. It is often said that the rich
and successful are not entitled to keep their wealth because others have
contributed to their enterprise by not destroying it. But if the basic norm is one of
noninterference, then no one should be paid for observing it, but should be taxed
or punished for violating it. Only if one is agnostic on baseline questions, is it
necessary to ask whether all persons have to pay their assailants to be free of the
risk of rape or murder, a conclusion that creates endless transactional
complications.
One historical example shows the point. In California and other western states,
the last half of the nineteenth century was marked by constant battles between the
forces of open range (whereby landowners were under a duty to “fence out” cattle
from their land) and closed range (whereby cattle owners were under a duty to
“fence in” their cattle to keep them from trespassing).15 If the question of baselines
were of little or no consequences, the choice of rules should not matter all that
much, save for the partisan aspirations of farmers and ranchers. But the
differences are not those that arise simply in a zero sum game. Thus Kenneth
Vogel has rightly observed the radical asymmetry between the two rules: a rule
that requires landowners to fence out roving cattle makes it difficult for the
landowner to buy off some ranchers in order to preserve the land for agricultural
use.16 The alternative system allows the landowner to permit some cattle owners
to use the land without opening to all simultaneously. Again the asymmetries are
very large in the consequences that they generate for an overall evaluation of the
law.17
The robustness of the common law baselines also indicates that the modern
constitutional doubts over the harm/benefit distinction, both in academic and
judicial work, is again sadly overstated.18 The philosophical skepticism on choice
of baselines takes a particular transaction out of its larger context, and ignores the
massive difference in allocative consequences from saying treating A did not harm
15 Garcia v. Sumrall, 121 P.2d 640 (Ariz. 1942).
16 See Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 16 J. Legal Stud. 149 (1987).
17 Why then ever allow the open range? The answer has to be only use it when the number of
persons who want to devote their land to agriculture is so small that it is cheaper to bear the risks
of excessive straying, relative to the transaction costs of allowing selective entry. It follows that
open range statutes will lose popularity as population increases, which is roughly as things move.
See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes, 42-45 (1991).
18 For some of the guilty parties in this line of thought, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1165, 1196-1201 (1967), and see the decisions of Scalia, J. and Kennedy J. in Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S., 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992). I have criticized their excessive reliance on the
reasonable expectations model in Richard A. Epstein, A Tangled Web of Expectations: Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1369 (1993).
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B may always be used as a verbal equivalent for A conferred a benefit on B. It is
therefore for good reasons that we accept a set of boundary conditions that treats
acquisition as the root of ownership and requires other individuals to pay for what
they wish, in the ordinary sense of that term, to purchase. Once these baselines are
established, the next question is under what circumstances, and with what results
to we allow individual conduct that falls outside the rules of this simple game
begins with the initial baseline—“buy don’t take.” Indeed the general law of
“privilege” is intelligible precisely because it starts with this simple common law
baseline and then identifies in a cautious way the special circumstances in which
some modification is required.19 But the strength of the common law baseline lies
in the fact that it is serviceable over a wide range of cases, so that matters of
privilege, while important both practically and theoretically, are confined and
infrequent and are never allowed to dominate the overall system.
II. Positive and Negative Externalities
The decided preference for “buy, don’t take” should quickly put us in a tort
frame of mind. The basic interactions of taking something from the possession of
another are policed under a rubric of “shame on you if you take,” not “thank you
for not taking.” But there is still the question of how a system of restitution—one
that calls for compensation for benefits conferred—fits into the overall scheme of
legal arrangements. In order to see how the problem arises, it is useful to ask this
question: to what extent can it be said that individual actions only “concern” an
actor, or that voluntary exchanges only concern the parties to them. For those
actions that fall into either of these categories we are saying in effect that we don’t
have to worry about the law of tort, or for that matter the law of restitution. We
can now have actions that on net make either one or (by contract) more persons
better off than before. Since no one else is left either better or worse off in
consequence of what is done, the private gains to the individual actor or to the
trading partners travel effortlessly to the bottom line: since these private gains
match up one-to-one with social gains they should be encouraged.
Yet there are no individual actions that “concern” only one individual or the
small group of individuals that has entered into voluntary arrangements.20 Every
transaction has innumerable consequences—positive and negative—with respect
to the fortunes and satisfactions both of the individual actor, his trading partners,
and of many other individuals. The grand question for the legal system is how
ought this endless array of internal and spillover effects to be taken into account.
The first approximation to that question raises a parallel to the issues that were of
concern to Wittman: one could have a rule that said that we register all gains and
losses to all parties, including all externalities from individual actions, positive or
negative, on some comprehensive utility scale, and then require the individual
19 See infra at 22.
20 For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, The Harm Principle, supra note 9.
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actor, or group of actors to internalize all of these costs as he does his own private
costs and benefits. In principle, that procedure would require payment to those
who have lost from the exercise while allowing the exaction of some sort of fee
from those who have benefited from it. The class of actions that survive in this
world are those for which the gains in the actor’s satisfaction, coupled with the
collections from strangers, are sufficient to fund payments to those who are left
worse off in consequence, and still leave something left over for the actors
themselves. In a Coasean world of zero transaction costs, any questions of
evaluation of benefits and costs, the processing of claims, or collection and
distribution of funds, would be a trivial matter, so using this broad definition of
externality sets the perfect foundation for determining legal entitlements.
Of course, this proposed plan of action is manifestly unworkable as a legal
program when transaction costs are both positive and substantial. In this state of
affairs, it becomes necessary to allow for some liberty of action in a world of
inevitable spillovers, both positive and negative: it cannot be that each action has
to be justified to all other persons. It is not that there is no cost in ignoring the
complications of private actions, and behaving as though the only gains and losses
that matter are those which are naturally borne by the actor himself. When (net)
positive spillovers are ignored, then private benefits understate social benefits, so
it becomes likely that too little of the good or service will be produced, even if
reputation and informal persuasion fill in part of the gap left by a tolerant legal
order. Yet when (net) negative externalities are ignored, too much of the good will
be produced, even after the same set of reputational and informal sanctions do
their work. Most importantly, the most common cases are those in which
individual actions produce both negative and positive externalities
simultaneously, so that it is unclear whether excessive or insufficient production
of the activity is undertaken. Thus playing a guitar in the airport corridors,
building a house on a hillside, or ringing a bell on Sunday, may be pleasing to
some and a source of offense to others, always in varying proportions with widely
different intensities.21
What then are the respective provinces of tort and restitution in a world of
abundant externalities? The law of tort seeks to identify the class of negative
externalities that should be taken into account; the law of restitution or quasicontract for its part is directed toward the positive class of externalities. In each
case the decision is done against a backdrop of a presumption that the action in
question is one that otherwise produces net gain for the actor, for otherwise that
action would not be undertaken by a self-interested individual. It is also
understood that most people are willing to choose actions that promise net gains
to themselves even if they impose substantial losses on others. The connection
between gain and loss was perceived at least as early as Aristotle who urged that
the commission of many acts involved both a benefit that has been received by an
21 See infra at 35-36.
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actor and a harm that has been inflicted on another person, only to be uncertain
about how to deal with the gain in many cases. Consider one famous passage from
the Nicomachean Ethics:
For it makes no difference whether as good man has defrauded a bad man
or a bad man a good one, nor whether it is a good or a bad man that has
committed adultery; the law looks only to the distinctive character of the
injury, and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other
is being wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it.
Therefore, this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to
equalize it; for in the case also in which one has received and the other has
inflicted a wound, or one has slain and the other has been slain, the
suffering and the action have been unequally distributed; but the judge
tries to equalize things by means of the penalty, taking away from the
gain of the assailant. For the term “gain” is applied generally to such
cases, even if it be not a term appropriate to certain cases, e.g., to the
person who inflicts a wound—and “loss” to the suffered; at all events
when the suffering has been estimated, the one is called loss and the other
gain.22
Here Aristotle tries to make it appear as though every case falls into the easy
category where the gain to the wrongdoer equals the loss to the victim, so that
restoration is easy. This model works well enough when money received when
someone is defrauded can be restored (with interest). But it works far less well in
the wounding case where the “gain” may take many forms: e.g., the business
advantages of not having to skate against Nancy Kerrigan, or the simple reduction
in the cost of precautions. When gain does not equal loss, the tort impulse has the
measure of damage equal to the loss, which ex post is usually larger than the other
gain, even if the gain from lower precautions is certain and the losses are only a
remote.
For all the weaknesses in Aristotle’s treatment, it does set up the theoretical
unity in the assessment of gains and losses by raising the questions in tandem. It is
puzzling therefore to see that these two bodies of law are so often discussed as
though they fall into separate compartments. But a unified approach seeks to
work out the connections between them, and to use the insights that are obtained
to explain why as a body of doctrine the law of restitution, while part of the
system, is less central to the operation of the private law system than the law of
tort, but still critical to its complete understanding nonetheless.
If all the effects of a given action were confined to the actor, then there would
be little reason for the law to disentangle benefits from harms. The person could
engage in that exercise himself while choosing his course of action. The legal
problem therefore is to deal with the effects, both negative and positive, that
individual actions have on others. Here the basic question is to pick out those
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book V, Ch. 4.
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spillovers to which the legal system will (at some positive cost) generate a
response, and those consequences, positive or negative, that are best left outside of
it. In essence we proceed by identifying those cases that fall at the extremes of
either easy inclusion or exclusion, and then feel our way to the mass of cases that
fall somewhere in the middle.
In dealing with the law of restitution, one of the first tasks is to be sure that the
remedies that are afforded are part and parcel of a system capable of sensible
administration of justice. One constraint is that the class of benefits conferred
(remember the baseline case of exclusive owners with transfer by voluntary sale is
solved) for which compensation is required must be small enough to be
manageable. At this point, the quasi-contract term is suggestive if only because the
law seeks to mimic contractual transactions where explicit voluntary
arrangements cannot at low cost provide the same relevant benefits.23 By
implication, when voluntary transactions are available, it is best that they be
allowed to operate. It is better that you ring my doorbell for permission before
cutting my lawn instead of cutting the lawn and then ringing the doorbell
demanding compensation for the cut grass. Even if I am out of town, the
intermeddling is “officious” because I could have well guarded against the
prospect of an untended garden by hiring a gardener on a long-term contract to
take care of matters whether I am at home or not. So “first do, and then pay” has
no more attraction than the incentive schemes that Wittman has imagined for the
nonpurchase of goods from strangers. To give but one mundane example it is a
sign of social disintegration when strangers start washing your front windows
when your car is stopped at a red light, only to demand payment with the implicit
of damage if payment is not forthcoming. No exception to the general rule here.
The question still arises, however, as to what cases fall into the exceptions from
this general rule that benefits should be provided through voluntary transactions.
Here we can take a leaf from the account of voluntary action given by Aristotle in
Book V of his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle’s basic position is that all actions are
presumed voluntary until we can show otherwise, and that the two major causes
for revising that original estimation are actions that are done under necessity and
under mistake.24 The source of the compulsion could be natural events or the
actions of other individuals; and so too with the source of mistake. But however
induced both of these conditions undermine the normal robust assumption that
people ought to be responsible for the consequences of their own acts. It is useful
to recall how these conditions work.
Compulsion. Compulsion (or necessity) imposes a constraint on the domain of
choice so that people who act are not free, not in the trivial sense of having actions
23 A familiar theme, stressed in Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed: Property Rights, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972); Richard A.
Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law 133-134 (4th ed. 1992).
24 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, 964 (Richard McKeon ed. 1941).
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that are caused (for all motivated actions are caused in some sense) but in the
sense of laboring under external constraints that alter their choices in ways that (1)
are sufficiently infrequent so that they may be singled out, and (2) sufficiently
dramatic so that the distinction is rendered workable in practice.
It is worth noting that Aristotle’s account dovetails fairly closely with the
common law. His two instances of compulsion represent the act of a God and of a
third party, both of which deny that the defendant did the act. Aristotle also
recognizes that actions done in fear of greater harm fall into a difficult case, as
indeed they do at common law, most notably in the famous cases of Weaver v.
Ward25 and Smith v. Stone.26 Thus in Gilbert v. Stone,27 the companion case to
Smith, the defendant entered plaintiff’s land in order to escape pursuit by a third
party. The court held that he was liable for the trespass but that the party who
compelled his entry could not be sued. Aristotle is uncertain as to whether liability
should attach because the action was voluntary in one sense (i.e., the product of
individual volition) but involuntary in another (i.e., the product of external
compulsion). He writes:
Those things, then, are thought involuntary, which take place under
compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the
moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is
contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g., if he
were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their
power.28
Aristotle’s account is quite sketchy, for it does not address either the issue of
multiple causation and relative responsibility that lie at the heart of the common
law doctrines of proximate causation. Focusing on these issues, moreover, allows
us to escape the Aristotle’s dilemma of either treating actions done under
compulsion as though they were either fully voluntary or wholly without moral
responsibility.
The key to the discussion is to draw a strong distinction between principles of
absolute or ultimate responsibility on the one hand and relative responsibility on
the other.29 When the question is one of relative responsibility the question to be
asked is only whether as between the parties to the dispute, the edge should be given
to either the plaintiff or the defendant. In principle the repeated application of
principles of relative responsibility should allow a strict hierarchy to be
established among all actors who are involved in a given dispute. All that is
25 Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B. 1616) (no trespass “as if by force a man take
my hand and strike another”).
26 Smith v. Stone, Style 65, 82 Eng. Rep. 533 (K.B. 1647) (no trespass, if carried onto land of
another).
27 Style 72, 82 Eng. Rep. 539 (K.B. 1647).
28 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, 964 (R. McKeon ed. 1941).
29 See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 174-177 (1973).
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necessary are successive comparisons in which the loser of the initial dispute then
tries his luck against some other defendant, on the same question of relative
responsibility. If there are n possible parties to a dispute, then in principle n-1
actions should establish the relevant hierarchy, such that any person with lesser
responsibility is allowed to sue any person with greater responsibility. The
question of rank ordering is critical whenever any party is insolvent, for in a
system of relative responsibility, the party with greater responsibility is liable to
those with less, notwithstanding that he does not have an action over against a
party with greater responsibility. Absolute responsibility, in contrast, only looks at
the two extremes. It assumes that all parties are solvent and present in a single
litigation. Under those circumstances all the middlemen, so to speak, drop out of
the equation, so that the party who is injured has one and only one action, that
against a party with the greatest responsibility.
This distinction is of greatest importance in the simple case where A compels B
to enter C’s land. If the only question is the relative responsibility, then C can
recover from B, for while C did nothing at all, B did enter C’s land. Precisely
because A is not amenable to suit the action should be allowed. But under a
system of absolute responsibility, however, C can only recover from A, and B
drops out entirely given the excuse that external compulsion supplies to his
conduct. Recall now that B is Aristotle’s man who acts under compulsion, and the
ambivalence that Aristotle observes becomes understandable because in a system
of relative responsibility B is responsible to C but may have an action over against
A. In a moral system, the imperfections of the real world do not impinge on
matters of accountability, so that only A is responsible. The older common law
rules that allowed suits by C against B, but not against A thus show the tension
between the ease of proof within a tort system and the matter of ultimately
responsibility: the true culprit escapes. Yet even that judgment is contingent on the
question of whether B could have an action for indemnity against A, an issue on
which there is, as best as I can recall, very little authority in the early cases, but for
which an action is easily allowable under the more expansive twentieth century
notions of proximate causation.30
Mistake. Likewise, mistake is said to negate voluntary action because it leads
people to place the wrong values, positive and negative, on the choices that they
make, and hence leads them to do things that they later regret when the true state
of affairs comes to light. Just as necessity can arise from natural events or the
actions of third parties, so too with mistake: Mistake may be the result of a simple
misunderstanding or it may be induced by mischief and fraud of other
30 See, e.g., Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Rr. Co., 196 U.S. 217 (1905),
which generally denied actions for indemnity, but would allow it where the wrongs of the two
parties were not of equal degree. Note that many modern systems would excuse B entirely because
of the external compulsion.
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individuals. The differences between these two cases seems reasonably clear.
Where the mistake is induced by the misrepresentation of a third party, then one
party is wholly passive and innocent, while the other party is not passive and may
have acted either negligently or fraudulently. But the cases of joint innocent
mistake remain the most difficult for both moral and legal systems, for there is
reason to believe that the foundations on which conduct has been undertaken or
bargains made have been removed, yet it is often difficult to assign responsibility
for them.31
III. Conventional Grounds for Restitution
A. Necessity and Compulsion
It is very clear that the categories of compulsion, or necessity, and mistake
have genuine purchase power in the law of tort, where they are usually invoked in
order to alter the usual rule that allows the owner of property to exclude others at
will from the premises.32 The better solution is the one that calls for the creation of
a conditional privilege, whereby the thing can be taken or used so long as
compensation is made for the rental value of the property and the damage so
caused.33 That approach adopts the “take now, pay later’ approach for these
transactions. It also gives rise to the question of whether one should treat this as a
case of restitution for benefit conferred instead of simply as a matter of liability for
harm caused.34 The point behind this intuition is that there is no necessary
correlation between the harm caused to the owner of the property and the (far
greater) short term gain that is obtained by the party using the property under
conditions of necessity. But on this point too the better answer has been that the
restitution measure creates an undeserved windfall, and that all persons are better
off with the knowledge that they can use the property of others in times of
necessity without having to forfeit a monetary sum equal to the value that they
attach to their own life or good health.35 The theory of restitution does not make
good sense when the benefits conferred are done so by happenstance or chance—
or indeed by the decision of the user of the property and not its owner.

31 See Goff & Jones, 87-136. for extensive discussion of mistake of law and fact. E. Allan
Farnsworth, Contracts 677-700 (2d ed. 1990).
32 Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908). (“It is clear that an entry upon the land of another
may be justified by necessity. . . .”)
33 Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co., 109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910).
34 See, e.g., Robert Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 401 (1959)
(arguing that the benefit in Vincent conferred on the boatowner was the avoidance of loss of the
boat).
35 For a discussion of the tradeoff between holdout and externality in connection with the
necessity cases, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State 54-58 (1993).
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It is a far different situation, with very different legal consequences, when
some organized effort by one party is necessary to save or salvage the property of
others, when immediate necessity prevents the formation of some contract
between them. Here a risk adjusted rate of return for the activities, capped by
some substantial fraction of the property saved, becomes the legal norm.36 That
result is one that is most conspicuous in the law of salvage, where the rescuers
have to bear substantial costs to keep their fleet at the ready. Nonetheless the same
principles seem to apply in other contexts as well, where an immediate necessity
prevents the formation of a voluntary contract suitable for saving of life and limb.
The famous case of Cotnam v. Wisdom37 confirms just that instinct by allowing a
restitution remedy for a physician who gave surgical treatment that did not save
an unconscious man who had been mortally injured when thrown from a street
car. Here a remedy was allowed because there was no risk of bypassing a
voluntary market, and little risk of providing services that the victim himself
would have refused if competent to bargain. It is perhaps a somewhat closer case
as to whether the fees should be allowed only in those cases where the services
were successful and not otherwise. The advantage of tying the payment to
outcome is that it helps guard against the provision of medical services in hopeless
cases, solely to extract a fee from the helpless victim. Yet on the other side, it is
evident that in ordinary fee for service medicine the payment to physician is not
typically conditioned upon the soundness of the diagnosis nor the success of the
treatment. It is paid for the rendering of services in good faith, irrespective of the
outcome. In nonconsensual settings, the risk of unwanted services is a greater
possibility, but not so powerful as to justify a switch of rules to one that looks at
outcomes only. Instead it seems better to monitor this question directly within the
context of a rule that allows for payment of routine fees, and thus refuse the fees
on the ground that there was no reasonable basis for provision—an easy judgment
only where the patient was certain to die no matter what heroic measures were
adopted.
Cotnam v. Wisdom is also interesting for its evaluation of the damage remedy.
Fees for services rendered are not set by heaven, and here the plaintiff set his fee
after making inquiries as to the net worth of the decedent, with the obvious
intention of acting like a price-discriminating monopolist. The court held, rightly
in my view, that this information had to be ignored, and the reasonableness of fees
had to be set independent of the knowledge of defendant’s wealth. In so doing it
36 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. Legal Stud. 83 (1978); Richard A. Epstein,
Holdouts and Externalities: One More Salute to Ronald Coase, 36 J. Law & Econ. 553 (1993). Note
too that restitution runs against the hull so that the salvor obtains priority over a ship’s mortgagee.
The rule makes it possible for the salvor to negotiate without regard to the state of the title. Note
too that the benefit is also conferred upon the first mortgagee whose security could well be
worthless at the bottom of the sea. See Saul Levmore, Explaining Creditor Priorities, forthcoming.
37 104 S.W.2d 164 (Ark. 1907).
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mirrored the outcome of a competitive market in which price discrimination is not
possible no matter what the absolute or relative wealth of the purchaser.38 In fact
the question of overcharging for emergency services on a spot contract is not an
issue of isolated importance, but is indeed one of major institutional importance,
for virtually all routine accidents present the same risk that matured in Cotnam.39
It is important, however, to be aware of the limits on generalization on this
question. In this issue, Saul Levmore addresses just this issue in an instructive
comparison of two cases in his contribution to this issue.40 In Leebov v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,41 the plaintiff was a builder who used his trucks to
shore up a construction site in order to prevent major landslide damage to nearby
properties. His trucks were destroyed in the successful operation, and the value of
the property saved was far greater than the losses averted, losses for which the
defendant insurer would have been held surely liable under its insurance policy.
Although the losses were in some sense voluntary, they occurred in a setting
dominated by necessity and the insurance company was doubtless far better off
paying for the trucks than the tort losses. Liability for necessity seems to make
sense.
The further question, however, that Levmore asks is whether recovery in
restitution makes sense where success does not validate the initial decision to
shore up the hillside, that is, in those cases where both the trucks are lost and the
neighboring property is destroyed. Here we do not have the advantages found in
Cotnam v. Wisdom, namely of a consistent pattern of voluntary transactions against
which to measure the reasonableness of the behavior in this case. But if the
question here is whether one can detect any form of opportunism on the part of
Leebov, or any collateral motive for doing the act, the answer appears to be no.
The conduct here is exactly what the insurer would have wanted, playing the
38 A point that was intuitively grasped by the court in Cotnam which quoted with approval the
following sensible passage from Robinson v. Campbell, 47 Iowa 625 (1878). “There is no more
reason why this charged should be enhanced on account of the ability of the defendants to pay
than that the merchant should charge them more for a yard of cloth, or the druggist for filling a
prescription, or a laborer for a day’s work.”
39 Just this problem, for example, was common in England when personal injuries were treated by
physicians who were reimbursed under the poor law for their actions. Where the person injured
was treated by physicians under contract with the local township, the costs incurred were small.
But when someone had the misfortune to be injured away from his home base, the charges
demanded could be inordinate. See A.W.B. Simpson, Priestley v. Fowler, (Mss with author) 33-41.
The basic rule settled upon was that treatment for the “casual poor” those who were injured away
from home fell on the parish in which the injury took place. The advantages of the rule were two. It
offered a clear rule, and it assured prompt treatment that could be otherwise denied if the local
parish sought to move the hapless victim home in order to escape the charges in question. Applied
uniformly the burdens equaled out, so there was a form of restitution of sorts, between parishes.
40 See Saul Levmore, Obligation or Restitution for Best Efforts, So. Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming
1994). See also his earlier paper, Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 Va. L. Rev. 65 (1985).
41 165 A.2d 82 (Pa. 1960).
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odds. It is important not to overstate the issue because unlike Cotnam, a fairly
detailed contract of insurance regulated the issue,42 and it could have stated that
Leebov took this actions at his own risk, just as most insurance contracts for
damage to the insured’s property or liability on it require that the insured take
loss-reducing precautions in the maintenance of property both before and after
coverage is extended. Still it is a good guess that the right answer is one that treats
the cost of good faith but unsuccessful efforts to prevent the landslide as
compensable under a restitution theory.
Levmore’s companion case, McNeilab v. North River Insurance Co.,43 arose out of
the Tylenol tampering cases of the early 1980’s. After Johnson & Johnson (the
maker of Tylenol) learned of the first instances of tampering, it removed all its
Tylenol capsules from the market even though the Food and Drug Administration
did not require any recall. The removal campaign has widely been hailed as the
master response to a crisis situation, for it left Tylenol with public praise and a
higher market share than before the incident took place. As an outgrowth to the
episode, however, McNeilab sought to recover its recall expenses under its
insurance policy, forcing in effect the comparison between its case and Leebov.
Levmore notes the obvious distinction between the two cases: with Leebov the
extra precaution was successful, while with McNeilab only a few additional tablets
laced with cyanide were discovered. He then notes that in situations of this sort, it
is tempting to infer that the recall was not prompted by a fear of liability ex ante
because it did not reduce that liability ex post.
While this is surely part of the situation, several other pieces to the puzzle have
to be noted. Leebov did not present any overarching concern with public good will
or regulatory response, both of which deal with losses that are generally outside
the scope of liability coverage. In addition, there was ample time for a consultation
with the insurer before embarking on a $100 million recall campaign, and as
Levmore notes, recall insurance is available for a separate premium, which
militates against providing for it under the standard liability policies. The failure
of the outcome and the presence of a manifest collateral motive differentiate this
case from Leebov. All in all, there is sufficient reason to believe that the conduct
undertaken by McNeilab was not conduct which ex ante was in the joint interest
of both the insurer and the insured, so that necessity in question (such as it was)
did not justify the imposition of the loss in question. As with the law of tort,
restitution cases can only be understood if a sharp distinction is drawn between
restitution in cases of benefits conferred on strangers, and restitution in the context
of ongoing, if incomplete contractual arrangements.44

42 On this contract/restitution overlap, see Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of
Contract, So. Calif. L. Rev. (forthcoming 1994).
43 645 F. Supp. 525 (D.N.J. 1986).
44 On which again see Kull, supra note 41.
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The entire question of whether payment in necessity cases should be
dependent on success is one that yields to no dominant outcome in cases of
genuine uncertainty. In principle we could make the parties indifferent to the
choice of rule by altering the level of compensation paid when success occurs. But
there is an enormous difference between a probability of 0.1 and 0.001; yet after
the fact it is often not possible to decide which type of long shot was brought
home a winner. In addition, if the multiple for compensation becomes too large,
the solvency constraint begins to bite. Few surgeons use contingent fees for
surgery in successful cases, and it seems unlikely that it should be adopted here.
Yet before wedding one’s self to a rule that predicates a remedy solely on the
rendition of services, recall that (unlike Leebov and McNeilab) the salvor cases are
all contingent on success, but subject to a clear upper bound of 50 percent of the
cargo and hull saved. The size of the transactions, the publicly verifiable nature of
the evidence, the collateral motives of the intervenor all play their part in the
analysis. Yet why should we expect otherwise. In the area of voluntary contracts
there is no dominant solution. Sometimes payment is contingent on performance;
often it is not. The law of restitution could hardly achieve a uniform solution that
is simpler than that observed in voluntary arrangements directed to this very
question.
B. Mistake
The second category of cases that falls under the rubric of restitution involves
cases of mistake. Yet here too there is an instructive parallel to the tort side of the
problem. Consider the case where the defendant cuts and harvests the plaintiff’s
trees, thus committing the wrongs of trespass and conversion.45 The widely
known doctrine of waiver of tort permits the plaintiff to tie recovery not to the loss
suffered, but to the benefit obtained by the defendant.46 Some early cases took the
line that the tort could be waived only in the event that the trees were sold,
thereby establishing their market value.47 But while resale is surely the easy case,
there is no reason in theory why it should be the only case: if the timber is kept or
used by the plaintiff, the gain obtained is more difficult to monetize, but nothing
in the law of unjust enrichment suggests that the plaintiff should not be allowed to
prove up those damages if they are substantially greater than the tort recovery.
The reason why waiver of tort is invoked is to prevent the defendant from making
a profit by bypassing the tort system, and the extraction of full benefit operates as
the equivalent of injunctive forms of relief.48 Clearly, further modifications are,
45 See for discussion, Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law 97 (1881). For the rule which
holds a converter liable when property is taken under an innocent and excusable mistake, see
Maye v. Tappan, 23 Cal. 306 (1863).
46 On which generally see Goff & Jones at 605-623.
47 See, e.g., Jones v. Hoar, 22 Mass. 285 (1827).
48 See, e.g., Braithwaite v. Akin, 56 N.W. 133 (N.D. 1893).
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and should be made for those conversions made in bad faith, where the defendant
is not permitted to reduce the amount paid by the costs of cutting and collecting
the trees, that is, by an amount equal to the benefit that his wrong conferred upon
the plaintiff who no longer need expend his own labor to achieve the same
result.49 The rules that are applied to mixture of goods by honest mistake, wherein
each side is given compensation in proportion to the benefits contributed to the
joint enterprise, carry over without losing a beat to the instant situation.50
Yet just as the law of necessity need not be moored to the law of tort, so too
with the law of mistake. One early mention of quasi-contract in the Roman law is
in a text of Gaius, which speaks of money paid over by mistake to discharge a debt
that was not owed. The explanation given was that the action to recover the
money so paid could not be in contract, since there was no promise to return
money that had been paid in order to discharge, not create an obligation.51 The
explanation for the rule is easy to see, for if the money is not returned, then the
transaction will become de facto a gift, even though the mistake negatives any
donative intent by the defendant. As with the case of conversion it is easy to
imagine situations in which the remedy of restoration is not so easy to implement.
If goods delivered by mistake are converted or consumed, then the appropriate
remedy is the restoration of like goods to plaintiff, or that failing, a payment of the
reasonable price for the goods in question.
IV. Restitution and Tort.
A. The Matching Principle
Thus far I have assumed that the impulse toward restitution manifests itself in
the creation of some special remedy for a plaintiff who has conferred some benefit
upon plaintiff where a voluntary transaction was not possible and a gift not
intended. But not all situations in which benefits are conferred are appropriate for
the invocation of the restitution remedy. Legal actions are always costly to bring,
and those for restitution may be especially complicated, especially if the benefit
conferred upon another party takes the form of a reduction in cost difficult to
measure. In addition, in many cases the intention is to make a gift of services for
which no direct compensation is expected.

49 For discussion, see Richard A. Epstein, Inducement of Breach of Contract as a Problem of
Ostensible Ownership, 16 J. Legal Stud. 1, 17-21 (1987) (noting the relationship between conversion
cases and inducement of breach of contract).
50 For the early statement of the rules, see Justinian’s Institutes, Book II, Title I, 25-34.
51 See Gaius, Institutes, III, 91. “He too who receives what is not due to him from one who pays in
error comes under a real obligation. . . . . This sort of obligation, however, appears not to be
founded contract, because one who gives with an intent to pay means to untie rather than to tie a
bond.” Note that the real obligation to which Gaius had just referred was the contract of mutuum,
that is, an loan of goods with a promise to restore like kinds and numbers.
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Yet even when the benefit conferred does not create some direct right of action,
it may be taken into account by indirection, namely exerting its influence on
principles of liability applicable under the law of torts. The prospective rescue or
assistance may go astray, and when it does the question is whether the putative
rescuer has become an unhappy tortfeasor responsible in damages for the party
that he would assist. That result can surely occur, but even so, there seems to be a
clear pattern in the tort cases where conferring a benefit, or even attempting to do
so, diminishes the anticipated liabilities on the would-be rescuer. A rescuer may
not be able to recover under a theory of restitution, but will, if sued, be able to use
the benefit conferred to lower the standard of liability used for judging his conduct
under the tort law. The principle is in fact one of fairly broad application in all
cases of bodily injury or property damage, whether in the context of strangers or
contractual parties. It is instructive to look at some of the patterns here.
The key to the analysis is the same as before: any given action is likely to
generate a whole bundle of consequences, some negative and some positive, some
borne by the actor and some borne by others. While the distribution of costs and
benefits is not strictly determined, the forces of individual self-interest tell us a
good deal about its shape in the ordinary case. In the absence of legal liability
most people will arrange their affairs so that they will be able to internalize the
benefits of their actions while dropping any harmful consequences into the laps of
others. The case for a system of strict liability rests on the dominance of one
recurrent and pervasive matching principle: the party that seeks to obtain the
benefit of certain actions is the one who, pro tanto, should bear the liability for the
losses that those actions cause. The great advantage of this principle is that it
spares the trier of fact the difficult after-the-fact task of seeking to determine what
level of care was appropriate in light of the external peril and the private gain: the
cost benefit analysis of the Hand formula provides no magic way to estimate the
benefits that are difficult to measure under the law of restitution.52 In place of
such difficulties, the strict liability rule identifies the party whose conduct inflicts
losses on another, and forces him to bear these losses as though they were inflicted
on himself.53
52 See United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (per Learned Hand, J.). The
commentary on the formula has been exhaustive. For its most notable early defense, see Richard A.
Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. Legal Stud. 29 (1972).
53 Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151, 158 (1973). “The action in tort in effect
enables the injured party to require the defendant to treat the loss he has inflicted on another as
though it were his own.” Note that this explanation slides past the Coasean difficulty, analyzed
above, of deciding what action is a cause of what harm, and acts as though the use of force against
another person meets that standard. The issue is of little relevance here because the same problem
of causation applies no matter whether one uses a negligence or strict liability standard, or for that
matter any other. See Epstein, supra note 35 at 577-79. For an effective criticism of my position, see
Ernest Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 407 (1987); see also, Richard A.
Epstein, Causation—In Context: An Afterword, 63 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 653 (1987), in turn criticizing
Weinrib for the belief that the negligence principle is defensible as some kind of necessary truth.
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B. Consensual cases.
Yet it would be a mistake to assume that some inflexible law of nature requires
that defendants seek to internalize all benefits and externalize all costs. There are
many situations, both contractual and with strangers, where the distribution does
not follow this standard mode, and it is precisely in these settings that the greatest
deviations from strict liability are found. To begin with some consensual cases, the
traditional categories of bailment, incorporated from the Roman Law through the
great decision in Coggs v. Bernard,54 were heavily sensitive to the planned
distribution of benefits and burdens. A priori, it may not be possible to determine
where the benefits from bailments writ-large will flow. If the bailor seeks safekeeping for goods that the bailee is not allowed to use, the benefit runs to the
bailor. If the bailee is to use the bailor’s fine china at his own tea party, then the
benefit runs to the bailee. If the bailment is to allow the bailee to perform a task for
a partnership between the two, then it is joint. The risk of loss, at least under the
classic English and Roman conceptions was responsive to these variations in
benefit and tended to trump a powerful but constant fact, that the bailee was
always in possession, and hence better able to avoid the risk. Instead the risk of
loss follows the distribution of benefits: where the bailment was for the bailee,
then the rule was strict responsibility, save for loss by the enemies of the Crown or
vis maior. When benefits were for the bailor, then good faith efforts; for both, then
ordinary negligence. The party that receives the greater benefit bears the greater
burden—unless there is some contractual stipulation to the contrary.
Other consensual areas may also involve similar sliding scales. The traditional
distinction between invitee, licensee and trespasser is one that to some extent
tracks the benefits that both sides derive from a broad class of transactions.55 The
invitee enters a commercial establishment with an eye toward mutual gain; the
licensee does so at the pleasure of his host, where hospitality dominates
commercial exchange; and the trespasser seeks to gain by his wrong against the
owner. The traditional classification on the subject had the standard of care move
in lockstep with the distribution of benefits: the invitee was owed a duty of
reasonable care, including reasonable inspections; the licensee was owed a duty to
warn about concealed traps or defects, without any independent duty of
inspection. The trespasser took all risks in the premises except those which were
deliberately or willfully set for his destruction. The modern impulse tends to
diminish the categorical nature of this classification, and thus tracks the similar
trend for bailment: one standard of reasonable care may be applicable to the
circumstances of these different cases.56 But the shift in standards may be
somewhat less important than meets the eye, for it is always open for a successful
54 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1704).
55 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§328E—350. For a succinct account of the classical
distinctions, see Robert Addie & Sons (Collieries), Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A.C. 358.
56 See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968).
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defendant or plaintiff’s attorney, as the case may be, to indicate how the status of
the plaintiff influences the reasonableness of the care that is owed to her—a case
by case recreation of the original categories, which in many jurisdictions still retain
their original vitality today.
Medical malpractice situations involve much the same considerations. The
physician who operates does so for the joint benefit of both sides; indeed his
benefit is from payment; the operation is cost for him and benefit for his patient.
The standard of ordinary care, so dominant in medical malpractice cases, reflects
this distribution of benefits and costs, and reflects further the inordinate difficulty
of asking plaintiff to fund ex ante payments under a strict liability rule, which is
likely to generate far greater payoffs, given the intrinsic risk inherent in all
dangerous medical procedures.57 Once again the mixed distribution of benefits
and costs leads away from the strict liability rule applicable in the paradigmatic
stranger case.
Some similar strands are found in the area of products liability, where the sale
of a product generates both benefits and risks to the plaintiff. A product that
carries with it positive risk may be a good product nonetheless, if the risk imposed
is smaller than the risk that the plaintiff would faced if forced to use some riskier
alternative. That mixture of benefits and losses has led most modern courts to
abandon strict liability rules in favor of some intermediate standard of care,
usually couched in cost/benefit if not negligence language. I think that there is
much to be said against the undifferentiated cost benefit standards so dominant in
these contexts, and have elsewhere defended the more extensive use of a
customary standard against the more ad hoc balancing tests.58 But for these
purposes the critical point is that the element of implicit benefit to the product
user is what again drives the courts away from a strict liability standard, as the
general thesis predicts.
Even here, however, it is critical not to be too dogmatic about the overall
outcome of the situation, for construction defect cases are often governed by strict
liability rules instead of say, a rule that places the burden of proof for negligence
on the defendant.59 But these all present defendants with a relatively easy choice:
57 Strict liability rules for medical malpractice have been occasionally suggested, see Clark v.
Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525 (Cal. 1967) (per Tobriner, J.); but when the proposal has been put into action,
even on a limited scale, it has been usually condemned, see, e.g., Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981
(Wash. 1964); overturned by statute Wash. Rev. Code, §4.24.290. See generally, J. Jerry Wiley, The
Impact of Judicial Decisions on Professional Conduct: An Empirical Study, 55 So. Cal. L. Rev. 345
(1981). Likewise there is an enormous reluctance to infer any contract for cure in this setting: see
Sullivan v. O’Connor, 296 N.E.2d 183 (Mass. 1973) (per Kaplan, J.). The rejection of strict liability
under contract goes a long way to explain why the principle is never adopted under the ostensible
tort substitutes.
58 Richard A. Epstein, The Path to the T.J. Hooper: Of Custom and Due Care, 21 J. Legal Stud. 1
(1992); see also, Richard A. Epstein, The Risks of Risk/Utility, 48 Ohio St. L. J. 469 (1987).
59 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A.
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greater inspection produces fewer defects, an option that is just not available in
the design defect type of case, where any mistakes infect the entire product line.
With this said, the ease of the strict liability standard in construction defect cases
probably redounds to the benefit of the defendant that adopts it: the greater the
security against defects of this sort, the higher the price that can be commanded.
Most manufacturers want to have strict warranties on such matters as purity and
contamination. The opposite standard creates a marketing disaster (think again of
Tylenol) that is far greater than the tiny liabilities for breach of warranty.
C. Stranger Cases
The consensual cases, then, show a genuine willingness to calibrate the
defendant’s duty to his anticipated level of gain. In principle, there is no reason for
the rules in stranger cases to necessarily ape the default rules adopted in
consensual situations. But by the same token there is little reason for the rules in
stranger cases to deviate from them either. The stranger case is characterized by
the lack of any direct interaction between the soon-to-be plaintiff and the soon-tobe defendant before the infliction of harm in the particular case. These cases
therefore are, almost by definition, high transaction cost cases. If the default rules
in consensual situations afford some information as to how persons act in low
transaction cost settings, then why not follow their lead unless and until some
good lead suggests a deviation. The effort therefore to tailor the losses to match
the implicit distribution of benefits can be applied here, and in many practical
situations it is.
Yet there are clear exceptions to a general rule, of which the rescue cases,
which figure so prominently in the law of restitution generally, are perhaps the
most prominent. These cases typically arise in contexts of necessity, where the
identity of the rescue beneficiary has a good deal to do with the level of care to
which the defendant is held. Thus in the standard case of private necessity, the
defendant avails himself of the plaintiff’s property in order to save himself. The
situation is more dramatic than the usual case of private gain and external loss,
chiefly because that no one wants to second-guess the defendant’s basic decision,
that is, no one wishes to enjoin the self-rescue that has taken place. But the ability
of the one party to force himself upon a neighbor only reinforces the basic instinct
behind strict liability: the defendant’s interest here is not merely to reduce its own
cost at the risk of some harm to a neighbor. It is to take the neighbor’s property
and to use or destroy it for his own benefit. Right though the decision may be, but
right as well is it to adhere to the original strict liability standard, which is
probably the dominant standard in cases of this sort.
Yet the strict liability standard starts to give way with change in the
distribution of benefits from rescue. Thus where defendant seeks to rescue
plaintiff’s property from near certain destruction, then the right response (although
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one not always followed in the early cases)60 is to reduce the standard of care for
the defendant, to one of good faith, to induce the effort to rescue in the first place.
Unlike the classical situation of private necessity just discussed above, self-interest
will impel potential rescuers to stay away from danger unless protected from the
additional risk of liability. The lower standard of care, usually one that requires
only conduct in good faith, protects against just that risk. And the strong
emergency exception to the usual rules on battery allows virtually any good faith
contact.61
A similar situation is covered by the doctrine of public necessity, that is, where
the defendant acts for the benefit of some third party.62 Here again a stringent
doctrine of liability creates the private incentive to shy away from some socially
beneficially act,63 while the lower standard of good faith liability (which still
protects others against malicious decisions) increases the likelihood of favorable
intervention in the first place.64 The reduction of the standard of tort liability still
leaves an imbalance in the system: plaintiff now suffers a loss while third persons
have benefited, but a better remedy is a direct action for restitution against the
persons who received as benefit that was scarcely intended as a gift by its passive
maker. And whether such action lies depends less on the power of the theory and
more on its administrative complications. It is surely possible, on a sound
restitution theory, to impose a special assessment on persons whose property has
been spared to cover prorata the losses of those whose property has been
sacrificed. By way of example the entire institution of general average
contribution, of such importance in the admiralty context, serves as a response to
the perils of the sea. The costs of jettisoning some cargo overboard are to be borne
proportionately by all who benefit (owner of the hull included).65 Superior
incentives are created when benefits and losses are brought into alignment by the
operation of the legal rule.
Still other situations involve a somewhat more concealed operation of the
benefit principle. One nice illustration of the point is Brown v. Kendall, in which
Chief Justice Shaw opts strongly for the negligence principle.66 The standard
60 See, e.g., The Tithe Case, Y.B. Trin., 21 Hen. 7, f. 26, 27, 28, pl. 5 (1506), discussed at length, in
Epstein, supra note 52 at 579-581.
61 Kennedy v. Parrott, 90 S.E. 2d 754 (N.C. 1956).
62 See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§196 & 262. See also, United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S.
149 (1952) (destruction of oil refineries about to be captured by the Japanese in World War II).
63 The most famous illustration is still the refusal of the good Mayor of the City of London to order
the tearing down of the Inns of Court for fear of liability, in consequence of which half a city was
burned. See the discussion in Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (1 Dallas. 357, 362 (Pa. 1788)).
64 See the recognition of the qualified privilege in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (Kent
State killings; qualified immunity for Ohio Governor Rhodes).
65 For discussion, see Landes & Posner, supra note 35, and Epstein, supra note 35 at 582-584.
66 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850).
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reading of Brown treats the case as one of general application—the level of care is
to be proportionate to the perceived peril, as the theory of negligence would have
it.67 At this most general level, Shaw is guilty of the charge that he addresses the
wrong question: to be sure, a hunter should take far greater care in shooting in a
crowded city than in an open marsh, but the decisive legal question lies not in
setting the standard of care, but in deciding who should bear the residual risks
that remain when reasonable care, however defined, is taken. The mere fact that
this risk shrinks as one moves from city to country scarcely affords a decisive
reason for shifting that (smaller) risk from defendant to plaintiff.
Yet anchored more closely to its facts, the outcome in Brown v. Kendall rests on
firmer foundations than this general critique of the negligence principle suggests.
The defendant was breaking up a fight between two dogs, one owned by him and
one owned by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was looking on, saw the risk, and did not
get out of the way of the moving stick that took out his eye. One line of defense
therefore is a cross between assumption of risk and contributory negligence,
which would not be available (at least under a strict liability system) if the plaintiff
had been a total stranger to the situation.68 But another goes more directly to the
standard of care imposed on a defendant where his actions are undertaken(as in
the ordinary bailment case) for both sides. The defendant, if successful in the
rescue, might not be able to charge the plaintiff something for his exertions, but he
can receive compensation in the indirect way mentioned earlier: by moving down
from strict liability to negligence, not because of a general rule liability rule, but in
response to the joint benefits generated by his actions.
The power of the joint benefit point is apparent also in cases that start with the
strict liability principle. Thus the “true rule” in Rylands v. Fletcher is “that the
person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there
anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he
does not do so, is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural
consequence of its escape.”69 In this context, the critical phrase of Blackburn’s
familiar incantation are the words “for his own purposes.” The strict liability rule
is confined to cases where the defendant seeks to obtain all the benefits from
filling the reservoir, leaving others at risk for the harms from flooding. The clear
67 “A man, who should have occasion to discharge a gun, on an open and extensive marsh, or in a
forest, would be required to use less circumspection and care, than if he were to do the same thing
in an inhabited town, village, or city.” Id at 296.
68 For which, see The Thorns Case, Y.B. Mich. 6 Ed. 4, f. 7, pl. 18 (1466): “So, too, if a man makes an
assault upon me and I cannot avoid him, and in my own defence I raise my stick to strike him, and
a man is behind me and in raising my stick I wound him, in this case he shall have an action
against me, and yet the raising of my stick to defend myself was lawful and I would him me
invito.” (Per Brian, counsel for plaintiff). The Restatement, following the negligence orthodoxy
takes the opposite line, and finds liability “only if the actor realizes or should realize that his act
creates an unreasonable risk of causing such harm.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §75.
69 Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279 (1866) (per Blackburn, J.).
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negative implication of Blackburn’s proposition is that the strict liability rule is
relaxed when it no longer offers the ideal match of benefits to burdens. The proof
of this particular pudding came quickly with Carstairs v. Taylor,70 a case where rats
ate through gutters that the defendant installed in his building for his own benefit
and that of the plaintiff tenant. The presence of the mutual benefit was held to take
the case out of the rule in Rylands and to lead to the adoption of some negligence
standard in its stead.
The distribution of benefits and harms is also critical to the law of nuisance.
Nuisances are difficult to bring within the framework of a single liability rule
because they come in so many sizes and shapes.71 In the simplest case, the
defendant operates a factory or mill that spews forth waste and filth that causes
harm to a neighbor. Where that single source of pollution causes substantial levels
of external harm, the matching principle holds that the defendant should be
strictly liable for the harm that ensues, even if no injunction is granted against the
injuries in question. The case is little different from one in which the defendant
shoots or otherwise strikes a hapless plaintiff. But as the cases become more
complex, the distribution of benefits and burdens shift, rendering the strict
liability principle far less attractive.
In other nuisance cases, the benefit principle has a more subtle, almost
underground, operation. One of the great problems of many nuisance-like
activities is that they generate both external harms and external benefits. Thus to
revert to an earlier illustration, the playing of a church bells may create genuine
disturbance to those within close range of them, while at the same time they may
provide nice music or background atmosphere to those who are located some
distance away. In principle, distance from the bells works as a rough proxy for the
harm or the benefit that their ringing creates: quite close, the harm dominates; at
the mid distance, the benefits; at the remote distance no one can hear them at all.
The question is what system of liability will generate the greatest level of net
benefits from its operation, summed over all persons. One possible approach,
which is convenient only in a zero-transaction cost world—is to tax all persons
who enjoy the bells and use the fund so-collected in order to pay benefits to the
parties at close distance who are forced to endure the din. If the funds collected
are large enough to compensate the losers, and leave the church satisfied with its
position, then ringing the bell may be said to make sense from a social point of
view because the compensation system in place leaves someone better off, and no
one worse off than before. Indeed it is not strictly necessary that the church take in
more money than it pays out. Even if it takes in less, it may be willing to pay the
difference if that cost is lower than the benefits which it enjoys. The costless

70 L.R. 6 Ex. 217 (1871).
71 For a good overall summary of the area, see Morgan v. High Penn Oil Co., 77 S.E.2d 682 (N.C.
1953).
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system of collection and transfers overcomes any distributional objection to the
bellringing practice.
Yet the manifest difficulty with this scheme of assessment and payments is that
the church has no effective method to collect its reward for the benefit that its
bellringing confers. Doctrinally, the objection is that the church transfers no
specific property to the fortunate souls who enjoy the church bells at a distance.
With that the obvious peg for restitution is knocked out from under,72 so that
what remains are diffuse but real benefits that are hard to value and impossible to
collect, at least at reasonable cost. Alas the church creates some positive
externalities for which it must go uncompensated. The issue then is what should
be done on the negative side of the line, for those inconvenienced by the din. One
impulse is just to say “tough” to the church: its failure to collect from one group is
its own problem, so it must pay for its losses to others even though it cannot
capture its gains. But that approach has difficulties of its own: the losses
themselves could be small relative to the costs of collection, and in the aggregate
small relative to the gains that the church bells generate to others. Putting
negatives on the church’s liability ledger but ignoring the positives creates a
divergence between the overall social benefit and the losses that are recorded on
the church’s private ledger. One second-best solution accordingly denies the
church’s obligation to compensate the losers precisely because it in turn cannot
collect its compensation from the winners.
Yet that solution too has limitations of its own, which loom ever larger as the
size of the uncompensated losses increase. It is perhaps for this reason that one
well-known opinion on the issue73 splits the difference and ties compensation to
the size of Rodgers v. Elliot the loss, “determined by the effect of noise upon people
generally, and not upon those, on the one hand, who are peculiarly susceptible to
it, or those, on the other, who by long experience have learned to endure it
without inconvenience . . . .”74 The upshot was that a plaintiff who was recovering
72 The Restatement of Restitution §522 (1937). “[R]estitution implies both a loss by him and a
receipt of something by another, . . .” where that something is usually a “receipt of property.”
As an illustration of this restrictive condition, see Phillips v. Homfray, 24 Ch. Div. 439
(1883). There defendant mined some of plaintiff’s minerals and used and abandoned wayleave
beneath plaintiff’s land for shipping his own ore. It was held that restitution was allowed for the
minerals taken, but that the action for the use of the wayleave did not descend on the owner’s
death because it constituted only a savings of expenses and not the conferring of a discrete thing
which descended on death. The economic logic here assumes that eliminating a liability should be
treated differently from the receipt of a benefit, although the beneficiary under a will is indifferent
between these two modes of enrichment. The efficiency of the common law, as a positive matter, is
not evident from the decision. For criticism of Lord Bowen and a defense of the dissent by
Baggallay, L.J., see Goff & Jones, at 608-614, “If it can be shown that the tortfeasor has gained a
benefit and that benefit would not have been gained but for the tort, he should, in our view, be
required to make restitution, however the tort is characterized.” Id at 613.
73 15 N.E. 768 (Mass. 1888).
74 Id. at 771.

The Ubiquity of the Benefit Principle

27

from a serious case of sunstroke in his nearby house could not recover from the
church manager for ringing the bell in his customary fashion, even after he
received a warning from the plaintiff’s doctor as to the anticipated nature of the
loss. In essence, the boundary lines for property had shifted, as if by prescriptive
right, so that the customary sounds of the bells were no longer an actionable
invasion, given that they had long been tolerated in the community, by among
others the plaintiff himself.
The case here causes some conceptual difficulty if this particular injury is taken
in isolation from its larger context, for normally the extrasensitive condition of the
plaintiff affords a defendant no defense: you take your victim as you find him.75
But that usual case is not decided against the widespread distribution of benefits
and burdens that are found when church bells ring. So long as there is some belief
that the customary patterns produce a net benefit on aggregate, then individual
damage actions cannot be allowed to set the balance astray. The right response lies
in other directions. One prospect is for compensation to be supplied by other
means: a reduction in local real estate taxes is a convenient mechanism for
achieving that result, with the shortfall picked up by those who benefit, assuming
of course a unified taxing district that may not exist. Then once the expectations
are set, the harm is minimized when individuals sort themselves by location:
persons sensitive to noise move furthest from the church; and persons who are not
move closer. When mass phenomena are involved, each person cannot act as
though there were no counterweight to any autonomy claim. No one can demand
pure air and choose to live in East Los Angeles. Rodgers has the right approach
once benefits and burdens are taken simultaneously taken into account.
The shadow role of the benefit principle is relevant in other nuisance contexts
as well, where again the choice of legal role is dependent on the magnitude and
frequency of certain types of harms. “The live and let live doctrine” applies to
situations where many small nuisances take place simultaneously.76 In each case
there is good reason to believe that the benefit from causing the nuisance is greater
than the harm sustained by its being caused: most people would tolerate a little
noise if the alternative requires them to remain absolutely silent. Since these
nuisances are widespread, the distribution of benefits and harms shifts
dramatically, at least when a market basket of these actions is considered together.
Now the benefits created will dominate the harms inflicted, both in the aggregate
and, to a high probability, for each person. It is as though, therefore, each person is
compensated for the harm inflicted by the like power to inflict harms on others, so
that the benefits generated obviate the need for any cash compensation, and lead
one to a position in which the rigors of a strict liability rule are displaced, not by
some rule of negligence, but by a total privilege to engage in these acts short of
75 See, e.g., Smith v. Brain Leech & Co., Ltd, [1962] 2 Q.B. 405; and that old standby, Vosburg v.
Putney 50 N.W. 403 (Wis. 1891).
76 Bamford v. Turnley, 3 B.&S. 67, 83, 122 Eng. Rep. 27, 32-33 (Ex. 1862).
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malice. The reciprocal negative easements of support, follow the same principle.
The harms inflicted by restricting the ordinary use of property are more than
offset by the gains obtained when others are subject to parallel limitations on their
own use. Here the benefits match costs without any form of legal intervention, so
that gains and losses are allowed to remain where they lie, but only so long as
malice is not part of the overall picture.
V. The Public Face of the Benefit Principle
In this section I want briefly to complete the sketch of the scope of benefit
principle by noting its critical role in public and constitutional law contexts. The
intention here is to be impressionistic, not systematic. My goal is to note how and
why the restitution principle comes to the fore in discussions of political theory.
One great movement in politics might be described as reductionist. Is it
possible to explain theories of political obligation by resort to only three wheels of
the common law coach—property contract and tort. The basic goal of this
reductionist program is to avoid the charge that something special is afoot in
political theory by showing that ordinary conceptions of obligation, usable in
private contexts allow one to account for the power that the state has over its
citizen and the obligation of the citizen to obey the state. The efforts to find the
source of political obligation in consent—immortalized in the phrase of the
Declaration of Independence, that our leaders rule only with the consent of the
governed represents one such effort. And the countless observations that the
appeal first to express consent, then to tacit consent or implied consent, simply
substitutes assertion for theory, and fiction for description. The consent that one
demands and finds in ordinary contracts cannot justify the powers of coercion that
the state exerts over its individual members.
More generally, the nub of the issue is that the grounds for political
obligation—what does a citizen owe to the state—cannot be satisfactorily
explicated solely by resort to principles of property, contract, and tort. Private
property explains how individual things can be reduced to private ownership and
common property preserved. Contract explains how labor and property may be
exchanged. Tort protects labor, property, and the exchange relationship from
interference by others. Yet so ubiquitous an institution as taxation, in any of its
protean forms, cannot be accounted for by property, contract, and tort standing
alone, or indeed by all three taken together. Repeated efforts to talk about “social
contracts” as though they were simple generalization of ordinary contracts for
selling property or hiring labor fail: no one believes that the requisite consent from
so many disparate people, past, present and future could be, or has been,
acquired. The social contract, it has been said, is not worth the paper it is not
written on, and modern efforts to work out that theory have all emphasized the
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hypothetical nature of the consent which drives the underlying transaction.77 But
just because the obvious theories fall short, can we reject all forms of taxation, or
must we expand our repertoire of tools to determine which forms of taxation are
legitimate and which are not?
For most people the answer is no: political obligation there must be—strong
enough to account for a state and its power to tax, but not so strong as to leave
nothing left to individual discretion and control. With that conclusion reached, the
question is how to build down toward the foundations. The decisive building
block of the system is the theory of restitution for benefits conferred. The state
provides benefits to the individuals within its jurisdiction and meets its own
payroll by collecting taxes from the parties who are so benefited. It is allowed to
force the exchanges because voluntary exchange cannot yield the desired
outcomes so long as anyone and everyone is allowed to hold out for more than a
proportionate share of the gain from social organization. The necessity here is not
that of a raging storm or an impending car crash. It stems from the massive desire
to obtain social improvements that better all, but which cannot be reached by
voluntary exchange. Over and over again political writers such as Locke and
Blackstone point to necessity as the foundation of property and hence of the
political institutions organized to defend property.78 They do so in ways that
strengthen the stark opposition between necessity and consent by insisting that
the presence of the former renders the latter unnecessary. When they speak of
necessity, they anchor their own theories to the benefit principle of the law of
restitution: the state may recover the costs of conferring benefits on its citizens,
and it may recover the costs of its service by using the coercive power of taxation.
Hence the benefit conferred by political bodies becomes the basis for citizen
obligations of allegiance and support.
Nor is there any reason to be surprised why the idea of restitution assumes so
extensive a role in political discourse. Under the private law, the principles of
restitution reach their maximum power in circumstances where voluntary
transactions do not function well: cases of necessity and mistake set the stage for
invoking the principle. In the public context necessity does not relate to the need
77 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) for the most notable exercise in modern contractarian
theory. See also James Buchanan, The Limits of Liberty (1975).
78 “And will anyone say, he had no right to those acorns or apples, he thus appropriated, because
he had not the consent of all mankind to make them his? Was it a robbery thus to assume to
himself what belong to all in common? If such a consent as that was necessary, man had starved,
notwithstanding the plenty God had given him. We see in commons, which remain so by compact,
that it is the taking any part of what is common, and removing it out of the state nature leaves it in,
which begins the property; without which the common is of no use. And the taking of this or that
part, which does not depend on the express consent of all the commoners.” Locke, Second Treatise
on Government §28. Note the tension: consent is not the basis of the right of property, although it
is the basis of the political obligations. What Locke lacked was a systematic appreciation of the
scope and role of the restitution principle when coordination problems were acute, as is the case
when the consent of all the commoners is required for any of them to eat.
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in two person situations to violate exclusive rights in order to stave off imminent
peril. Rather it stems from the stalemate that can easily emerge with time when
cooperative efforts of huge numbers of persons are necessary to make the state go.
While competitive markets can function well when only a small fraction of the
total community participate, the political order requires unanimous participation
of all lest the violence of one undercut the stability of expectations that is the
hallmark of both private property and stable governments. Although the source of
the necessity may differ, the legal response to it is the same: the principle of
compensation for benefits conferred takes over where the principle of voluntary
exchange leaves off.
It is one thing to state this familiar theory and another to make sure that it
operates in the most effective manner possible. The critical question often depends
on the identification of before and after, which brings us back again to the baseline
problem with which this paper began. One possible approach is to ask whether
the individual is better off with the creation of the state than he was without it, no
matter what is done after the creation of the state. So if the state of nature carries
with it serious inconveniences, the movement to a political order could well
improve the welfare of all individuals from—to pick numbers—a pre-state figure
of 1 to a post-state figure of 10. At the second stage it passes a statute that reduces
the welfare of one group to 5 while advancing that of another, a bare majority, to
12. This second maneuver here is not problematic for the winners, but it raises
serious issue for anyone concerned with the overall social picture, given that total
losses outweigh total gains.
Is that second action legitimate under a theory of restitution? If the state of
nature is the baseline, then the losers at round two cannot complain because they
are still better off than they were in the state of nature. With that said the level of
political discretion is enormous, for no matter what shifts in fortune are brought
on by state action, all its movements are legitimate until the level of protection that
any person or group receives falls below the level of security that he could obtain
for himself unilaterally in a state of nature. Locke himself was aware of this
extreme risk and reserved the right of revolution precisely to forestall that
contingency.79 But his solution does not address the problem at hand, for the right
of revolution would not, and could not be exercised when state power moves an
individual from 10 to 5: who would give up four more units of welfare to protest
the five that have already been lost. Clearly far better social results will be
obtained if the gains from the first maneuver could never be used as a setoff to the
losses that are subsequently imposed by government action. What additional
protections should be added to the mix?

79 Locke, Second Treatise, ch. 19, esp. §222, treating the dissolution of government as the sole
remedy for a breach of trust by the legislature or the executive. No mention is made of remedies
that stop particular acts of oppression without overturning the government altogether.
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So the question is how to make sure that shifts of this sort do not take place,
without relying on a remedy so drastic that like poison gas or nuclear weapons, it
will rarely if ever be used. The trick here is to find a way to insure that for each
government action, taken separately there is reason to believe that state coercion
provides each citizen with equal or greater benefits than the burdens imposed.
The restitution principle has to apply to each action, not just to the total program.
On this view once the state moves one group from 1 to 10 by the formation of the
political order, so 10 now becomes the new baseline against which further state
actions are measured. Improvements from the state of nature do not remain in
political solution but become vested a matter of private right: they establish a new
baseline against which further action is measured. On that view this second tax
could not be passed, although other taxes with greater net gain and even
distribution could be passed.80
From this it is possible to see how a powerful theory of takings with just
compensation—a strong restitution theory—becomes the centerpiece of any sound
system of political order.81 The first move in the game is to recognize that all
variations in the bundle of rights associated with property, whether for one
individual or many, yield some net benefit that justifies the use of public force.
Where the legislation itself provides some benefit in kind, then no additional
compensation is necessary for those persons who might claim themselves
aggrieved: once the state is formed the holdout problem is not allowed to
shipwreck additional maneuvers that promise some overall advantage. But often
state initiatives will have profound disparate impact, and where that happens cash
compensation becomes the benefit conferred on the individual to justify the
imposition of state power. In principle, the way in which costs and benefits are
netted out is critical to the operation of the successful system, but the public law
need only follow the procedures that were used and applied in dealing with the
complicated nuisances cases in which large numbers of persons were both
benefited and harmed by a common practice.
Stated most simply, the drill undertaken with church bells in Rodgers v. Elliot is
just a precursor of the identical problems that arise when roads and highways are
built, and must be funded by either general taxes or special assessments. Yet in
some cases, compensation for the land taken need not be made in cash, because
the enormous increase in value (through access to markets) of the lands retained
by the original owner afford compensation in kind. In principle one would like to
impose the taxes and payments in ways that equalized the gain across the affected
individuals in proportion to their contribution, but often the measurement
80 Thus if the winners benefited from an expenditure by more than the losers lost, the program
could go forward with a transfer payment. For a discussion of taxation and the maximization of
surplus, see Richard A. Epstein, Bargaining with the State, ch. 9 (1993).
81 For my fuller defense, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain (1985).
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problems require the use of crude proxies (assessments by front footage) to reach
second best solutions.82 But no matter what is done, and how it is done—tasks
that take us too far afield here—one point should become clear. The principles of
restitution are a two-edged sword. No theory of the state can do without them, but
by the same token no sound theory can go beyond them. Bluntly stated, no theory
of limited government is viable unless it incorporates at its heart a theory of
restitution: the government must confer some benefit of equal value on the parties
against whom it seeks to exercise its coercive force.
Indeed we can go further: it seems clear that one can trace the decline of the
modern theories of taxation to the severance of its linkage to the private law
theories of restitution. The connection is evident in the nineteenth century
thought, as when Thomas Cooley summed up the issue in a single sentence:
“Taxation is the equivalent for the protection which the government affords to the
person and property of its citizens; and as all alike are protected, so all alike
should bear the burden, in proportion to the interests secured.”83 So simple, so
smart. Cooley conceives of each person as having rights relative to the
government, and his insistence that the burden be in proportional to the interest
secured is an effort to make constrain discretion in the imposition of government
burdens. Cooley’s view allows for no social or common good independent of the
interests of groups and individuals in society, and his principle of lockstep
advancement insures that the social power of taxation cannot be used to advance
the welfare of some but to prejudice others, such as the differential impact created
by the second tax in the example above.
Yet the modern view of the benefit principle erodes it from within it. Thus
Justice Stone writing a half-century later misses the major risk in one of the most
chilling assertions of modern constitutional law:
The only benefit to which the taxpayer is constitutionally entitled is that
derived from his enjoyment of the privileges of living in an organized
society, established and safeguarded by the devotion of public purposes.
Any other view would preclude the levying of taxes except as they are
used to compensate for the burden on those who pay them, and would
involve the abandonment of the most fundamental principle of
government—that it exists primarily to provide for the common good.84
His version of the benefit principle mistakenly holds that the only baseline that
matters is the state of nature, so that the losses created by the second enactment
are fully set off by the gains received on the organization of society: in his world it
is possible to drive people from 10 to 5, or even to 2, so long as they are not driven
82 Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation: Special Assessments in
the Nineteenth Century America, 12 J. Legal Stud. 201 (1984).
83 Thomas Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 613 (5th ed. 1883).
84 Carmichael v. South Coal & Coke, Co., 301 U.S. 495, 522-523 (1937).
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below one. His reference to the advance of the “common good” obviates the need
from determining the welfare of the society by looking at the welfare of all of its
members, one at a time, and summing over all persons, a point well understood
by Cooley who spoke of society as a collection of individual citizens, not as some
entity that floats above human kind. For Stone, losers are not allowed to protest
unless they are willing to exit society altogether, which they will not so long as the
state of nature (or migration elsewhere) is fraught with perils. The expansion of
government power consequent on the adoption of Stone’s view is enormous, for
the benefit principle that lies at the heart of a theory of restitution is corrupted
from within rather than repudiated from without. It follows once again that the
failure to incorporate or understand the benefit principle has its largest payoff in
the public law, where the principle is so much in evidence, and in neglect. There is
simply no short cut that allows the evaluation of the social worth of any legal rule
or government action apart from the consequences that it has on the population as
a whole. And the strongest confirmation of the secure place of restitution in the
private law is its indispensable place in any sound theory of public law.
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